Quoting Justice Powells articulation of diversity in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265, 314315, the Grutter Court noted that it is not an interest in simple ethnic diversity, in which a specified percentage of the student body is in effect guaranteed to be members of selected ethnic groups, that can justify the use of race, 539 U. S., at 324325, but a far broader array of qualifications and characteristics of which racial or ethnic origin is but a single though important element, id., at 325. v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1, 4950 (1973) (extolling local control for the opportunity it offers for participation in the decisionmaking process that determines how . Furthermore, Kennedy found that race-conscious mechanisms can be used by school districts to further the goal of diversity, a position rejected by the plurality. He writes that Justice Breyer misused and misapplied previous Supreme Court precedents in this area and that he greatly exaggerates the consequences of the decision of this case. And second, Kennedy faults the dissent for ignoring the "presumptive invalidity of a State's use of racial classifications to differentiate its treatment of individuals.". This distinction is critically important in the context of education. [Footnote 10]. For at least two reasons, however, it is wrong to place the remediation of segregation on the same plane as the remediation of racial imbalance. Id. United States v. Montgomery County Bd. of Oral Arg. The District then petitioned for an en banc ruling by a panel of 11 Ninth Circuit judges. In this Courts finest hour, Brown v. Board of Education challenged this history and helped to change it. See Appendix A, infra. 3, p. 71 ([T]o make such a transition, would undo what we have been doing, and which we propose to continue to do for the uplift and advancement of the education of both races. Ibid. The context here does not involve admission by merit; a childs academic, artistic, and athletic merits are not at all relevant to the childs placement. 2002), but then withdrew its opinion, finding that the appeal turned on an unsettled question of state law which the state courts would best be able to answer in the first instance. NO. Finally, the plan created two new magnet schools, one each at the elementary and middle school levels. of Oral Arg. in No. Compare ante, at 39 (It was not the inequality of the facilities but the fact of legally separating children on the basis of race on which the Court relied to find a constitutional violation in 1954), with Juris. This plan is in place as of 2017. Due to a variety of factorssome influenced by government, some notneighborhoods in our communities do not reflect the diversity of our Nation as a whole. None of the considerations trumpeted by the dissent is relevant to the constitutionality of the school boards race-based plans because no contextual detailor collection of contextual details, post, at 222can provide refuge from the principle that under our Constitution, the government may not make distinctions on the basis of race. Adarand, 515 U. S., at 240 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). It added magnet programs at two high schools. appeals for the sixth circuit. Id., at 39a. Regardless of the outcome, this decision will surely have an effect on public schools, be it in the composition of their student body, their admissions policies, or their educational approach generally. The tenth high school, West Seattle, is located west of downtown. The plan required that each elementary school in the district maintain 20% to 40% enrollment of African-American students, corresponding to the racial composition of the district. ); internal quotation marks omitted). Dawkins & Braddock 403. ices Office, District Summaries 19992005, available at Most of the dissents criticisms of todays result can be traced to its rejection of the color-blind Constitution. Justice Kennedys second concern is directly related to the merits of Seattles plan: Why does Seattles plan group Asian-Americans, Hispanic-Americans, Native-Americans, and African-Americans together, treating all as similar minorities? See post, at 79, 23. See, e.g., Milliken, supra, at 746. As Justice Marshall said, unless our children begin to learn together, there is little hope that our people will ever learn to live together. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U. S. 717, 783 (1974) (dissenting opinion). Tex. Having looked at dozens of amicus briefs, public reports, news stories, and the records in many of this Courts prior cases, which together span 50 years of desegregation history in school districts across the Nation, I have discovered many examples of districts that sought integration through explicitly race-conscious methods, including mandatory busing. 6th ed. Thomas, J., filed a concurring opinion. See 539 U. S., at 320. App. Third, a more important response is the pluralitys claim that later casesin particular Johnson, Adarand, and Gruttersupplanted Swann. From Swann to Grutter, this Courts decisions have emphasized this distinction, recognizing that the fate of race relations in this country depends upon unity among our children, for unless our children begin to learn together, there is little hope that our people will ever learn to live together. Milliken, 418 U. S., at 783 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Again, however, the evidence supporting a democratic interest in racially integrated schools is firmly established and sufficiently strong to permit a school board to determine, as this Court has itself often found, that this interest is compelling. The district assigns students to nonmagnet schools in one of two ways: Parents of kindergartners, first-graders, and students new to the district may submit an application indicating a first and second choice among the schools within their cluster; students who do not submit such an application are assigned within the cluster by the district. The parties and their amici dispute whether racial diversity in schools in fact has a marked impact on test scores and other objective yardsticks or achieves intangible socialization benefits. See also, e.g., Offerman v. Nitkowski, 378 F.2d 22, 24 (CA2 1967); Deal v. Cincinnati Bd. Federal authorities had claimedas the NAACP and the OCR did in Seattlethat Clarke County schools were segregated in law, not just in fact. The justification for race-conscious remedies in McDaniel is therefore not applicable here. Thus, Washington state voters enacted an initiative that amended state law to require students to be assigned to the schools closest to their homes. Ante, at 67. In 1956, a memo for the Seattle School Board reported that school segregation reflected not only segregated housing patterns but also school board policies that permitted white students to transfer out of black schools while restricting the transfer of black students into white schools. See App. Thus, the dissent argues that [e]ach plan embodies the results of local experience and community consultation. Post, at 47. Ohio adds that a district may object to the enrollment of a native student in an adjacent or other district in order to maintain an appropriate racial balance. 3313.98 (F)(1)(a). Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School Dist. I join Part IIIC of the Courts opinion because I agree that in the context of these plans, the small number of assignments affected suggests that the schools could have achieved their stated ends through different means. 05915, at 410. It is an interest in helping our children learn to work and play together with children of different racial backgrounds. See Grutter 539 U.S. at 330. all the civil rights that the superior race enjoy). Neither school district has made any such specific findings. . See Brief for Petitioner at 21. All this is true enough in the contexts in which these statements were madegovernment contracting, voting districts, allocation of broadcast licenses, and electing state officersbut when it comes to using race to assign children to schools, history will be heard. Comparing Court Cases including Seattle and Brown v.Board.docx http://reportcard. See Brief for Respondents in No. Cf. A longstanding and unbroken line of legal authority tells us that the Equal Protection Clause permits local school boards to use race-conscious criteria to achieve positive race-related goals, even when the Constitution does not compel it. says nothing about the ultimate validity of any particular law. Id., at 229230 (internal quotation marks omitted). Does the Constitution mandate this inefficient result? See, e.g., id., at 111. It set forth its view prominently in an important opinion joined by all nine Justices, knowing that it would be read and followed throughout the Nation. As a result, different districtssome acting under court decree, some acting in order to avoid threatened lawsuits, some seeking to comply with federal administrative orders, some acting purely voluntarily, some acting after federal courts had dissolved earlier ordersadopted, modified, and experimented with hosts of different kinds of plans, including race-conscious plans, all with a similar objective: greater racial integration of public schools. And stubborn facts of history linger and persist. 503 U. S., at 495. The Court rejected the interests asserted to justify the layoff program as insufficiently compelling. What about historically black colleges, which have established traditions and programs that might disproportionately appeal to one race or another? Cf. Regardless of its name, however, the interest at stake possesses three essential elements. See also Freeman, supra, at 495496; Dowell, 498 U. S., at 248; Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U. S. 717, 746 (1974). Given the conditions in which school boards work to set policy, see supra, at 2021, they may need all of the means presently at their disposal to combat those problems. Thus, only by ignoring Grutters reasoning can the dissent claim that recognizing a compelling interest in these cases is an a fortiori application of Grutter. Here, Roberts provides the following string citation: Here Roberts cites: "See 539 U.S., at 320, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 156 L. Ed. Grutter at 33637; Gratz, 539 U.S. at 27071. See post, at 2829. 05915, p. 97. See ibid. This Court then held that the initiativewhich would have prevented the Seattle Plan from taking effectviolated the Fourteenth Amendment. Twenty-one elementary schools were between roughly 90% and 100% white. Section 4. The plurality's decision should not be read so broadly that it prevents the government from engaging in any race-conscious action. as Amici Curiae, with Rosen, Perhaps Not All Affirmative Action is Created Equal, N.Y. It nonetheless employs the racial tiebreaker in an attempt to address the effects of racially identifiable housing patterns on school assignments. Justice Breyer nonetheless relies on the good intentions and motives of the school districts, stating that he has found no case that repudiated this constitutional asymmetry between that which seeks to exclude and that which seeks to include members of minority races. Post, at 29 (emphasis in original). See Milliken, 418 U. S., at 74142 (No single tradition in public education is more deeply rooted than local control over the operation of schools; local autonomy has long been thought essential both to the maintenance of community concern and support for public schools and to quality of the educational process). I do not understand why this Courts cases, which rest the significance of a unitary finding in part upon the wisdom and desirability of returning schools to local control, should deprive those local officials of legal permission to use means they once found necessary to combat persisting injustices. . Jefferson County has failed to present any evidence that it considered alternatives, even though the district already claims that its goals are achieved primarily through means other than the racial classifications. The board began to implement the Seattle Plan in 1978. 2. In other words, it is not desegregation per se that improves achievement, but rather the learning advantages some desegregated schools provide. Id., at 744. This interest, the Court said, can be achieved by considering the student overall, not just his or her race, and the contribution he or she can make to the schools diversity. Similarly, the citation of Crawford v. Board of Ed. 2, pp. Today, they are not); post, at 66 (predicting further litigation, aggravating race-related conflict). No one here disputes that Louisvilles segregation was de jure. Moreover, this Court from Swann to Grutter has treated these civic effects as an important virtue of racially diverse education. The plurality opinion is at least open to the interpretation that the Constitution requires school districts to ignore the problem of de facto resegregation in schooling. See Croson, 488 U. S., at 501 (The history of racial classifications in this country suggests that blind judicial deference to legislative or executive pronouncements of necessity has no place in equal protection analysis); West Virginia Bd. 1996); see also T. Sowell, Affirmative Action Around the World: An Empirical Study 141165 (2004). For the next decade, annual program transfers remained at approximately this level. However, some students still must take public transportation. before adopting (or permitting the parties to agree on) a remedy . The plans initial busing requirements were extensive, involving the busing of 23,000 students and a transportation fleet that had to operate from early in the morning until late in the evening. For typical students, the plan meant busing for several years (several more years for typical black students than for typical white students). 05915, at 12, and n.13. The view that a more lenient standard than strict scrutiny should apply in the present context would not imply abandonment of judicial efforts carefully to determine the need for race-conscious criteria and the criterias tailoring in light of the need.

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